

Cybersecurity for Manufacturing Systems

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


FY 2016 Incidents reported to National Cybersecurity and Communication Integration Center (NCCIC)

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Unknown, 82

Spear Phishing,77



https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/FactSheets/ICS-CERT FactSheet IR Pie Chart FY2016 S508C.pdf

Threat - Destructive Malware



- Examples
 - SoBig 2003 Caused \$37.1 Billion in damages and is credited with bringing down freight and computer traffic in Washington D.C, as well as Air Canada
 - Stuxnet 2010 Took control of Iranian nuclear plant and uranium enrichment plant centrifuges, causing them to eventually fail

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- WannaCry 2017 Ransomware attack that infected more than 300,000 computers and shut down automotive plants and hospitals
- Action items to minimize destructive malware and other threats
 - Keep systems patched and updated
 - Implement Application Whitelisting where feasible (e.g., HMIs, database servers)
 - <u>https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Destructive_Malware_White_Paper_S508C.pdf</u>



Configuration and Patch Management



- Adversaries target unpatched systems. A configuration/patch management program centered on the safe importation and implementation of trusted patches will help keep control systems more secure.
- Prioritize patching and configuration management of "PC-architecture" machines used in HMI, database server, and engineering workstation roles, as current adversaries have significant cyber capabilities against these. Infected laptops are a significant malware vector.
- 85 of 295 (29%) incidents reported to ICS-CERT in FY 2015 potentially mitigated by proper configuration and patch management

https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/RP_Patch_Management_S508C.pdf

https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Seven%20Steps%20to%20Effectively%20Defend%20Industrial%20Control%20Systems_S508C.pdf



Application Whitelisting



- Application Whitelisting (AWL) can detect and prevent attempted execution of malware uploaded by adversaries. The static nature of some systems, such as database servers and human-machine interface (HMI) computers, make these ideal candidates to run AWL. Operators are encouraged to work with their vendors to baseline and calibrate AWL deployments.
- Example: ICS-CERT recently responded to an incident where the victim had to rebuild the network from scratch at great expense. A particular malware compromised over 80 percent of its assets. Antivirus software was ineffective; the malware had a 0 percent detection rate on VirusTotal. AWL would have provided notification and blocked the malware execution.
- 112 of 295 (38%) incidents reported to ICS-CERT in FY 2015 potentially mitigated by AWL
- Guideline for ICS Application Whitelisting

https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Guidelines%20for%20Application%20Whitelisting%20in%20Industrial%20Control%20Systems_S508C.pdf



Industrial Control System Cybersecurity Standards and Guidelines


- engineering
- NIST has been collaborating with industry, government, and academia since 2000 to add control systems domain expertise to already available IT cybersecurity Risk Management Frameworks to provide workable, practical solutions for industrial control systems
- Current efforts are focused on the development of a comprehensive cybersecurity risk management framework with supporting guidelines, methods, metrics and tools to enable manufacturers to quantitatively assess the cyber risk to their systems, and develop and deploy a cybersecurity program to mitigate their risk, while addressing the demanding performance, reliability, and safety requirements of manufacturing systems.
 - NIST SP 800-82 Guide to Industrial Control System (ICS) Security
 - ISA/IEC 62443 Standards
 - Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile



NIST SP 800-82

Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security

- Provides a comprehensive cybersecurity approach for securing ICS, while addressing unique performance, reliability, and safety requirements, including implementation guidance for NIST SP 800-53 controls
- Initial draft September 2006
- Revision 1 May 2013
- Revision 2 May 2015
- 3,000,000+ downloads, 800+ citations, de facto worldwide standard/guideline for industrial control system cybersecurity



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National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf



ISA/IEC 62443 http://isa99.isa.org/ISA99%20Wiki/Home.aspx

=	ISA-62443-1-1		ISA-TR62443-1-2	ISA-62443-1-3		ISA-TR62443-1-4	
Genera	Concepts and models	È	Master glossary of terms and abbreviations	System security conformance metrics	, ,	IACS security life-cycle and use-cases	2

Le co	ISA-62443-2-1		ISA-TR62443-2-2		ISA-TR62443-2-3	ISA-62443-2-4
P olicies P rocedu	Requirements for an IACS security management system	ž	Implementation guidance for an IACS security management system	2	Patch management in the IACS environment	Security program requirements for IACS service providers





tus	Published	📝 In development	C Development Planned
Star	Published (under review)	So Out for comment/vote	Adoption Planned



Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) Manufacturing Profile



- Develop manufacturing implementation (Profile) of the CSF using NIST SP 800-82, NIST SP 800-53 and ISA/IEC 62443 as informative references
- Manufacturing Profile is a Target Profile of desired cybersecurity outcomes and can be used as a guideline to identify opportunities for improving the current cybersecurity posture of the manufacturing system
- Framework 7 Step Process
 - Step 1: Prioritize and Scope
 - Step 2: Orient
 - Step 3: Create a Current Profile
 - Step 4: Conduct a Risk Assessment
 - Step 5: Create a Target Profile
 - Step 6: Determine, Analyze, and Prioritize Gaps
 - Step 7: Implementation Action Plan



Cybersecurity Framework Profile

- A customization of the Core for a given sector, subsector, or organization
- A fusion of business/mission logic and cybersecurity outcomes
- An alignment of cybersecurity requirements with operational methodologies
- A basis for assessment and expressing target state.
- A decision support tool for cybersecurity risk management

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Aligns industry standards and best practices to the Framework Core in a particular implementation scenario Supports prioritization and Framework measurement while Profile factoring in business needs Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover

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Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile

NISTIR 8183

NISTIR 8183

CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK MANUFACTURING PROFILE

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Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile

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http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2017/NIST.IR.8183.pdf

CSF Manufacturing Profile Implementation

• Implement CSF Manufacturing Profile in the Cybersecurity for Smart Manufacturing Testbed

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
- Measure manufacturing system network and operational performance impacts when instrumented with cybersecurity protections in accordance with the Manufacturing Profile
- Develop guidance on how to implement the CSF in manufacturing environments while minimizing negative performance impacts




Cybersecurity for Manufacturing Systems Testbed

Collaborative Robotics System









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Measurement System


Process Control System





Example Measurements – Collaborative Robotics

Network	Production	
Path Delay	Cycle Time	
Inter-Packet Delay	Part Production Time	
Round-Trip Time	Throughput Rate	
Information Ratio	Effectiveness	
Bit Rate	Utilization	
Computing Resources	Robot Performance	
CPU Utilization	Actuation Latency	
Memory Utilization	Pose Travel Time	
Disk I/O	Position Accuracy	
Interface Errors		




Production Rate



Example Measurements – Process Control

Network	Production
Path Delay	Output Yield
Round-Trip Time	Inputs Feed Rate
Packet Rate	Equipment Conditions
Packet Error Rate	Unplanned Stops
Packet Size Distribution	Unit Cost
Computing Resources	Field Bus-DeviceNet(DN
CPU Utilization	DN Network Delay
Memory Utilization	DN Network Utilization
Disk I/O	DN Data Size
Process Execution Delay	
OPC DA Delay	



National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) project

- t engineering aboratory
- NCCoE and the NIST Engineering Laboratory are collaborating to produce a series of Practice Guides demonstrating four cybersecurity capabilities for the manufacturing sector: behavioral anomaly detection, application whitelisting, malware detection and mitigation, and data integrity.
- NCCoE and EL are currently demonstrating behavioral anomaly detection and prevention mechanisms. The goal is to provide industry with detailed information to establish an anomaly detection and prevention capability in their own environments. By implementing behavioral anomaly detection tools, manufacturers are provided with a key security component that will aid in sustaining business operations, particularly those based on ICS.
- A behavioral anomaly detection for manufacturing Practice Guide, NIST SP 1800-10, will be developed from the research results. First draft of NIST SP 1800-10 is scheduled for May 2018.

https://nccoe.nist.gov/projects/use-cases/manufacturing



Thank You!

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